Summary report: Bilateral Verification Missions to Tsunami Affected Districts in Sri Lanka, January to February 2005
Bilateral verification missions were undertaken in late January to mid February 2005 to gather information about ongoing relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Tsunami affected coastal areas. The missions served as a quick reality check with a common focus on coordination efforts, issues of equity and political sensitivities. Nine districts were covered by seven bilateral teams: Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara, Hambantota, Matara and Galle.
The immediate relief phase is over in all districts. Thousands of people are living in temporary shelters, but even more live with their extended families and friends. Many are also still traumatised. Government compensation packages provide continued relief to those who lost their family members, houses and livelihoods. But it is unclear if these packages are distributed equitably. For example, there is no mention in the reports on the northern and eastern districts about the 15,000 SLR compensation for each deceased family member, and the 5,000 SLR for each damaged house that are being provided in the South.
Shelter, permanent housing and livelihoods were found to be the most critical and important areas by all district missions. While the status of psychosocial needs and coverage is somewhat unclear, the education, health and water and sanitation sectors are basically covered by planned and ongoing efforts. However, there appears to be a clear gap in the provision of water and sanitation services in Muslim areas in the North and East.
The South appears ahead of the North and East in terms of rehabilitation and reconstruction. For example, in Hambantota the need for fishing boats and related equipment (except for multi-day fishing) is assumed to be met within one or two months from now, and the permanent housing plan is well on its way and probably already over funded.
Livelihood activities focus on fisheries, with other and less dominant types of livelihoods so far relatively neglected.
Resettlement is intimately linked with the potential for livelihood recovery. Many people have had to move away from the areas where they used to live and make a living, and income opportunities in areas for relocation are not necessarily the same. Lack of transportation or rather individual funds for transportation was cited as an important constraint to the re-establishment of livelihoods.
Understanding the complex government machinery is crucial to all implementing organisations. In many cases, several ministerial departments are involved in the same basic issue and task. This is further complicated by the differing and changing roles and responsibilities for decision-making between central and district levels of government. Knowing what part of the bureaucracy is mandated to do what is often difficult, especially to newcomers, but still always essential.
The report summarizes its findings and conclusions for each district with focus on Conflict sensitivity, Subsidiarity, Consultation and empowerment and Information and coordination and some of the general conclusions made therein follows:
- Communities affected by conflict and general poverty, but not the Tsunami are being further marginalised by the massive Tsunami response. There are also disparities between and within affected communities creating tension, with some geographical areas over subscribed and others uncovered.
- Absence of agreed standards for the delivery of benefits is also a source of potential conflict, particularly where large numbers of implementing organisations with a pressure to spend quickly are involved.
- The buffer zone is a cause of serious concern among affected populations and could significantly escalate conflicts. Relocation may result in people being victimised twice, losing their families and houses in the Tsunami and then being forced to move away from the areas where they used to live and work. Involuntary relocation is wrong in principle, and previous disaster lessons confirm that it is anyway likely to fail its own objectives. Effective consultation with communities about needs is critical to mitigate the risks of contributing to existing tensions and increasing local conflicts
- Central government policy prescription and general standards for relief and reconstruction are elusive, unclear or absent. District and divisional secretariats do not appear to be effectively providing inputs from local knowledge into the policymaking process and are not effectively directing and supervising ongoing implementation on the ground.
- A complex and slow moving central government, combined with under staffed and inadequately equipped GA and DS offices, means that the power over planning, design and implementation of recovery efforts mainly rests with expeditious NGOs, rather than the lowest competent tiers of government.
- The above is problematic in recovery areas which typically are government’s responsibility, such as large scale housing and town programmes and coastal and marine ecology concerns related to fisheries, but less so for e.g. psycho-social counselling and MSME credit schemes.
- Consultation and empowerment of affected communities are so far principles that are largely neglected in actual practice. This not only violates rights and codes of conduct. It also means that many reconstruction objectives are likely to fail, for example those for relocation and permanent housing.
- More time is required for consultation and reflection in order for communities to become involved in planning and implementation. Women especially need to have their interests and priorities better heard and respected. Housing and livelihood programmes are particularly important in these respects.
- The interests and demands of affected communities need to be organised to stand a chance of feeding into plans and implementation. Local cooperative societies, community organisations and micro-finance schemes that existed prior to the Tsunami provide good and often necessary entry points for serious consultative and empowering efforts.
- Analysing information about implementation activities for overall planning purposes is a difficult but crucial task. Now that the immediate relief phase is over, and even bigger volumes of assistance are flowing in or waiting to be invested, information management at all government levels needs urgent attention including support for quick and practical IT solutions.
- Funding levels and the fact that many organisations receive funds from a variety of foreign sources for the same purposes, mean that the system is open to abuse and corruption. Registration, constructive regulation and audits are needed in a way that may not be required under more normal circumstances.
- Attention to unreliable statistics is necessary. Cases of over subscription and duplication were noted by the missions, due in many cases to no or wrong assumptions about damage and needs. Numbers of fishing boats repaired and replaced and permanent houses to be built are illustrative examples.
- UN assistance to the GA offices for coordination and supervision seems directed by internal UN procedures and is not adequate and effective. In LTTE controlled areas no UN personnel were found to be attached to the GA offices. Current and planned support to district and divisional levels for direction and coordination is clearly not proportional to the tasks at hand.
- Information and coordination at the field level is hampered by fragmented provision of sector by sector support, where instead integrated and livelihood based support is needed. This is an issue that should be carefully addressed by all actors in the design of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.
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